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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_________________ 
 
No. 17-1653 
_________________ 
 
JENNIFER L. KASILAG; LOUIS MELLINGER; JUDITH M. MENENDEZ; 
JACQUELINE M. ROBINSON; COURTNEY RUSSELL; DENNIS RUSSELL; DARIN 
DUDEK; THE KONRAD D. KOHL TRUST by Konrad D. Kohl, III, as Trustee, on 
behalf of and for the benefit of the Hartford Healthcare Fund; The Hartford Conservative 
Allocation Fund; The Hartford Inflation Plus Fund; The Hartford Balanced Fund; The 
Hartford Capital Appreciation Fund; The Hartford Floating Rate Fund 
                                                         
v. 
 
HARTFORD INVESTMENT FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC; 
HARTFORD FUNDS MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC 
 
                     Jennifer Kasilag; Louis Melliger; Judith Menendez; 
            Jacquline Robinson; Courtney Russell; Dennis 
         Russell; and K.D. Kohl Trust on behalf of the  
                          Hartford Healthcare Fund; Hartford Inflation Plus Fund; 
                                Hartford Balance Fund, Hartford Capital Appreciation Fund 
                                        Hartford Growth Opportunities Fund; and the Hartford Floating 
                                        Rate Fund,                     
                Appellants 
_________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 1-11-cv-01083, No. 1-14-cv-01611, and No. 1-15-cv-01876) 
District Judge:  Hon. Renee M. Bumb 
_________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 8, 2018 
 
Before: McKEE, AMBRO, RESTREPO, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Filed: August 15, 2018) 
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_________________ 
  
OPINION* 
_________________ 
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellants, shareholders of six mutual funds, sued the funds’ investment advisers 
for breach of fiduciary duty under § 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940. After 
granting partial summary judgment in favor of the Defendants, the District Court 
dismissed Appellants’ remaining claim with prejudice following a four-day bench trial. 
Because the District Court properly found that Appellants failed to meet their burden to 
show that the fees charged by the funds’ investment advisers were excessive in relation to 
the services they provided, we will affirm.  
I 
 As we write solely for the benefit of the parties, we set out only the facts necessary 
for the discussion that follows. Appellants are shareholders of six mutual funds1 (the 
“Funds”) managed by Appellees Hartford Investment Financial Services, LLC and 
Hartford Funds Management Company, LLP (together, “Hartford”).2 Hartford’s 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 “A mutual fund is a pool of assets, consisting primarily of [a] portfolio [of] securities, 
and belonging to the individual investors holding shares in the fund.” Jones v. Harris 
Assocs. L.P., 559 U.S. 335, 338 (2010) (quoting Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 490 
(1979)). 
2 Hartford Investment Financial Services, LLC (“HIFSCO”) served as an investment 
adviser to the Funds until December 31, 2012. Thereafter, Defendant Hartford Funds 
Management Company, LLC replaced HIFSCO and has served as an adviser to the Funds 
from January 1, 2013 to the present.  
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responsibilities are set forth in a series of Investment Management Agreements (“IMAs”) 
executed with each of the Funds. Pursuant to the IMAs, Hartford agreed to provide 
certain investment management services and administrative services. In return, Hartford 
received an investment management fee from each fund based upon the fund’s average 
daily net asset value. Hartford also contracted with a sub-administrator and various sub-
advisers to assist in performing its duties. 
Plaintiff-Appellants filed a derivative action on behalf of the Funds alleging that 
Hartford breached its fiduciary duty under § 36(b) of the Investment Company Act.  
Plaintiff-Appellants argued that the investment management and fund administration fees 
Hartford collected were excessive given the proportion of responsibilities Hartford 
delegated to its sub-administrator and its sub-advisers.  After granting in part Hartford’s 
motion for summary judgment relating to the conscientiousness of the Board of 
Directors, the District Court concluded that a trial was required to resolve factual disputes 
regarding the remaining five Gartenberg factors (discussed below). After a four-day 
bench trial, the District Court ruled for Defendant-Appellees, having concluded that none 
of the six Gartenberg factors favored Plaintiff-Appellants and that therefore they had not 
met their burden of proof on their § 36(b) claim.  This appeal followed. 
II3 
 Congress amended the Investment Company Act in 1970 to bolster the protections 
afforded to mutual funds and their shareholders. The amendment added § 36(b), which 
                                                 
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(5). 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
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“impose[s] upon investment advisers a ‘fiduciary duty’ with respect to compensation 
received from a mutual fund, 15 U.S.C. § 80a–35(b), and grant[s] individual investors a 
private right of action for breach of that duty.” Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 559 U.S. 
335, 340 (2010). In its seminal case on § 36(b), Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., the Supreme 
Court relied upon the Second Circuit’s decision in Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset 
Mgmt., Inc., in articulating the standard for assessing whether an investment adviser has 
breached its fiduciary duty.  694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982). It explained that “to face 
liability under § 36(b), an investment adviser must charge a fee that is so 
disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered 
and could not have been the product of arm’s length bargaining.” Jones, 559 U.S. at 346. 
The plaintiff bears the burden to show that the fee is outside the range that arm’s-length 
bargaining would produce. Id. at 347. 
To determine whether a breach of a fiduciary duty has occurred, courts consider 
the so-called Gartenberg factors: 
(1) the nature and quality of the services provided to the fund and 
shareholders; (2) the profitability of the fund to the adviser; (3) any “fall-out 
financial benefits,” those collateral benefits that accrue to the adviser because 
of its relationship with the mutual fund; (4) the economies of scale achieved 
by the mutual fund and whether such savings are passed on to the 
shareholders; (5) the comparative fee structure (meaning a comparison of the 
fees with those paid by similar funds); and (6) the independence, expertise, 
care, and conscientiousness of the board in evaluating adviser compensation. 
Id. at 344, 345 & n.5. 
We review a district court’s grant of partial summary judgment de novo. Morgan 
v. Covington Twp., 648 F.3d 172, 177 (3d Cir. 2011). We affirm its grant of summary 
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judgment when, viewing all evidence and drawing all inferences in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party, Shuker v. Smith & Nephew, PLC, 885 F.3d 760, 770 
(3d Cir. 2018), “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
 “On appeal from a bench trial, our court reviews a district court’s findings of fact 
for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo.” VICI Racing, LLC v. T-Mobile USA, 
Inc., 763 F.3d 273, 282–83 (3d Cir. 2014). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when it 
is completely devoid of minimum evidentiary support displaying some hue of credibility 
or bears no rational relationship to the supportive evidentiary data.” Id. at 283 (internal 
citations and quotation marks omitted).  
III 
 Appellants make three arguments on appeal. We will address each in turn. 
Appellants first challenge the District Court’s analysis of the fiduciary duty imposed by  
§ 36(b) as it relates to the services performed by the sub-administrator and sub-advisers. 
Specifically, they assert that the court must artificially bifurcate the investment 
management fees paid to Hartford and to its sub-administrator in evaluating excessive 
compensation liability. We disagree. Nothing in the statute, nor in our precedent, requires 
such a distinction. Nor does the statute prohibit an investment manager from 
subcontracting some of its management responsibilities. Accordingly, we see no reason 
to disturb the District Court’s finding that the fees, taken as a whole, were within the 
range of arm’s-length bargaining.  
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Appellants next argue that the District Court erroneously granted partial summary 
judgment when it found in Hartford’s favor on the sixth Gartenberg factor: that the 
Funds’ Board was careful and conscientious. For support, Appellants turn once more to 
their argument that their proposed distinction between the fees paid to Hartford and its 
sub-administrator required the Board to review and approve the compensation for each 
separately. Therefore, they argue, the Board’s failure to do so was deficient. As above, 
Appellants do not demonstrate that the District Court’s findings were clearly erroneous, 
especially given the particular deference we must give to factual findings. On the 
contrary, the District Court conducted a careful review of the Board’s composition, the 
frequency of its meetings, its consultation with outside advisers and the process by which 
it evaluated the fee contracts in concluding that the independence and conscientiousness 
of the Board, as described in Gartenberg, was not “in genuine dispute.” JA 61. The 
Supreme Court has made clear that a disinterested Board’s independent approval of 
compensation contracts should receive deference from the courts: “§ 36(b) does not call 
for judicial second-guessing of informed board decisions.” Jones, 559 U.S. at 352. 
“[E]ven if a court might weigh the factors differently,” where “the disinterested directors 
considered the relevant factors, their decision to approve a particular fee agreement is 
entitled to considerable weight.” Id. at 351. We are satisfied by the District Court’s 
determination that the Board was independent and comprehensive in its review of the fee 
contracts and that summary judgment on this factor was proper. 
Appellants’ final argument concerns the District Court’s aggregate treatment of 
their claims for each of the Funds. Specifically, they allege that, given the disparity in 
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compensation among the six Funds, the District Court erred by not performing a separate 
analysis of Hartford’s liability “for each Fund for each year.” App. Br. 47. This argument 
is unavailing. It ignores the numerous findings that the District Court made for specific 
funds and years in its evaluation of Appellants’ claims. Moreover, the text of § 36(b) 
neither requires a separate analysis for each Fund at issue nor prohibits varying 
compensation among funds. Rather, the Board-approved compensation scheme, based 
upon the average daily net asset value, contemplates varying fees tied to performance. 
Accordingly, the District Court did not err in its analysis of the fees for each of the six 
Funds over the years at issue in concluding that Appellants did not meet their burden of 
showing that Hartford’s fees were so disproportionate that they could not have been 
negotiated at arm’s length. 
IV 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the 
Appellants’ § 36(b) claim.  
 
 
